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Introduction
After decades of self-enforced isolation, and after a further two decades of externally enforced international 
isolation, Myanmar has finally come in from the cold. In response to the reform effort of President Thein Sein, the 
international community, led by the USA, Europe and Japan, has welcomed Myanmar back into the community 
of nations. This has been no easy task, for all these states had imposed varying levels of sanctions on the Myanmar 
state. Through the 1990s and early 2000s, the USA and Europe in particular (and Japan to a much lesser extent), 
implemented sanctions that became both broader and deeper over time. Now however, these sanctions have been 
curtailed, replaced by ever increasing amounts of aid. Whether or not the imposition of sanctions was ethical is an 
issue beyond the purview of this research paper, which will focus on the ethics of foreign development assistance 
to Myanmar’s transition.
  Despite the considerable challenges and voices of gloom, Myanmar’s transition could potentially become the 
broadest and deepest of recent years. In the economic sphere, Myanmar is continuing on its transition from a 
closed controlled economy to an open market economy, and this is to be done concurrently with industrialization. 
This process began more than twenty years ago, but was constrained by the sanctions. Politically, Myanmar has 
begun the transition from a military dictatorship to a multi-party democracy, and this is being done in conjunction 
with the continuation of state building efforts that will finally bring all the peoples of Myanmar into one political 
entity. This has a social aspect too, in that Myanmar’s myriad of ethnic groups will need to overcome decades of 
conflict and form one integrated society. In this way, Myanmar must transition from an ethnocentric Burman-
dominated society to an inclusive multiethnic society1). Myanmar’s transition is thus comparable to those 
post-Cold War transitions of Central and Eastern Europe. These states however benefitted from their close 
proximity to the EU, which was able to offer the prospect of membership as an incentive for reform. These states 
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were also already industrialized. Myanmar’s transition is also far more comprehensive than was China’s or 
Vietnam’s, which undertook only economic transition. Because of the magnitude of the transition in Myanmar, it 
is not unreasonable to view it as the transition of the early 21st Century and in this way, within the field of inter-
national relations, it the perhaps then a most suitable case study for investigating the ethical dimensions of 
development in general, and for external assistance for domestic reform efforts. Having said that, this is a tentative 
investigation of such ethical dimensions and should therefore be considered as a discussion paper. This paper will 
investigate ethics and development in Myanmar from two perspectives. From the international perspective, this 
paper will establish the extent to which ethics of development have been incorporated into the principles of ODA 
disbursal as defined by the official pronouncements of the international ODA regime. Having established the 
ethical dimensions of development and ODA, the second purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to 
which this is reflected in the reality of development/ ODA policy and practice in Myanmar. This will look both 
from the international perspective, in terms of the donors, but also from the domestic perspective, in terms of the 
extent to which the Myanmar government itself has adopted and abides by the ethics of development as outlined 
by the international ODA regime. This will be done through a number of case studies of recent aid-financed 
development projects in Myanmar. The empirical side of this research comes from interviews conducted with 
development practitioners in Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw between 2013 and 2015. These practitioners included 
officials at bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, Myanmar government bureaucrats, and Burmese develop-
ment workers/ researchers.
  Section one of this paper will discuss the ethical foundations that may underpin motivations for donors to 
provide ODA. Section two will look at the ethical aspects of development in general, through a discussion of the 
goals and purposes of development. These two sections therefore provide a discussion of the ethics of develop-
ment. The next section will deal with the international Official Development Assistance discourse, outlining the 
extent to which ethics of development have been incorporated into the development aid principles of the interna-
tional ODA regime. The final section will deal with how ethics of development and the interrelated principles of 
the international ODA regime have been accepted and incorporated into the Myanmar government’s development 
plans. This section will utilizes a number of specific examples of donor’s assistance to Myanmar’s transition to 
assess accordance with the aid principles and ethics of development.
The Ethical Dimensions of Donor Motivations
Why do developed countries provide aid to developing countries? Of course there is a domestic political economy 
of ODA in which stakeholders compete for resources and hence influence over the decision making process. In 
this way, ODA is no different from any other public finance, and hence susceptible to the vagaries of bureaucratic 
politics. Because of this, development in the recipient/partner country is not the main motivation. As the ODA 
industry has grown over time, this motivation for aid has become more complex. Looking back at ODA during 
the Cold War, it is generally accepted that for much of the ODA disbursed during that period, development was 
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of only secondary importance. National security, trade or resource acquisition were often more significant 
motivations (see for example, White, 1974; Yasutomo, 1986; Arase, 1995; Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy, 
2006). Therefore, the motivations for aid were other than development in the recipient country, and this is despite 
the stipulation by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, that ODA must have develop-
ment in the recipient country as its primary objective. Let us assume that the donors of ODA do indeed expend 
precious public finance for development in a foreign country that will benefit non-citizens and non-taxpayers. 
What would motivate a state to do such a thing?
  Do these reasons stem from altruism or selfishness, charity or self-interest? Obviously, realpolitik motiva-
tions stem from assessments of national interest. However, it seems that other ethical motivations also exist. 
Obligation may provide an ethical foundation for much of the development assistance that is disbursed. However, 
why do richer, developed states feel obliged to give development aid? It may stem from the experience of 
colonialism, in that colonizers and their descendents now have an obligation to compensate. Needless to say, this 
is based on an ethical concept of justice, whereby atonement for past misdeeds is necessary. Connected to this is 
the obligation that stems from an awareness of the structural imbalances built into the framework of the global 
economic system (that are very closely connected to the history of colonialism), which severely impede develop-
ment in many developing countries. Arguing that not providing humanitarian aid was morally wrong, Singer 
(1972) regarded such aid as a moral obligation or duty and not charity.
  Conversely, aid could be seen as an entitlement, and this stems from rights- based ethics. Eyben and Leon 
(2005) argue that because of the importance of ownership, and because entitlements are impersonal contracts to 
which both parties subscribe, it is better to view aid as an entitlement. In this way, development aid is the tool 
through which other rights (right to education, right to sanitation, right to work, etc.) are realized. This is based 
on the reality that, while the multitude of human rights may be accepted in principle, a certain level of capacity 
and capital may be necessary to protect and uphold those rights.
  Solidarity may also be an ethical motivation for providing development assistance. This sense of solidarity 
could stem from any of the myriad of philosophical traditions or religious faiths that mankind has constructed, but 
importantly, as noted by Goulet (2006) the “normative ideal of solidarity is not unrelated to certain empirical 
realities”. Whilst this does not deal with how and when this sense of solidarity affects behavior and shapes 
actions, it does merely recognize that a sense of solidarity can be a reason for providing development aid. 
Furthermore, “the solidarity approach is best understood as a duty-based approach or a rights- based approach to 
global deprivation (or both)” (Goulet, 2006, p. xxxv).
  The previously outlined ethics of obligation, justice and solidarity underpin the action of charity, which is 
defined as the voluntary provision of help or aid. Indeed, it is Gasper’s (1999) conclusion that charity is the ethical 
underpinning of most aid, both governmental and NGO. However, Eyben and Leon (2005) argue that, “aid 
conceived as a gift has few friends in the world of development practice because it illuminates through power 
relations, the personal, the relational and the emotional”. This means that charity is not a partnership; it is the 
product of an unequal relationship. Furthermore, charity is often merely another transaction, and in this way it is 
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not transformational, and may indeed be dependency producing. This was one part of the argument put forward 
by Garrett Hardin (1974), when he stated that rich countries had a duty not to provide aid because it would 
contribute to further population growth and create dependency. Crocker (2008) too, noted that, “in fulfilling 
obligations to alleviate immediate and individual misery, international donors and national agencies might 
inadvertently and even intentionally maintain a remediable system responsible for great deprivation”(p. 25). As 
will be discussed in greater detail in the following section, it is the purpose of development to remedy such 
dysfunctional systems, and it is therefore, the purpose of development aid to assist in such a reform process.
  Of course, in reality, there are usually a multitude of reasons for donors to provide development aid, some 
will be national interest and some may be based on ethical considerations. Incidentally, it may be that enlightened 
self-interest is the most effective motivator for donors of ODA. It seems reasonable that an understanding of 
interdependency, not just economical, but in terms of a broad definition of security that encompasses human 
security, environmental security, etc. could be used to persuasively used to underpin an argument for providing 
ODA.
Whither Development?
In his 1949 inaugural address, President Truman said, “More than half the people of the world are living in 
conditions approaching misery. . . . for the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to 
relieve the suffering of these people.” It is here therefore, over 60 years ago, that the period of modern interna-
tional development began. In the post-World War Two world, development was generally thought to be simply the 
increase in income and welfare that resulted from economic growth, which would result from industrialization. In 
this process, countries would modernize as Gross National Product increased. Poverty too was thought to be 
merely an insufficient income that resulted in a deficit in basic human needs. However, by the 1960s Development 
Decade, a more comprehensive definition of development (that included not just the economy, but politics and 
society too) began to be formulated. Poverty too, began to be defined as not just a lack of goods resulting from 
low income, but also as a lack of opportunity and capacity, and characterized by powerlessness and exclusion.
  In 1966 Goulet proposed the goal of development to be, “the fulfillment of man’s properly human potential-
ities, in the realm of intellectual, cultural, emotional, and spiritual growth by the use of his free powers” (Goulet, 
2006, p. 71). Here Goulet is outlining what would later be called ‘capacity’, or the ability of humans to fulfill their 
needs independently. Amartya Sen would later call this ‘development as freedom’, “freedom, . . . in the form of 
individual capabilities to do things that a person has reason to value” (Sen 1999, p. 56). Of course, in both cases, 
independent free will is essential for each individual to freely decide and then have the ability to undertake the 
chosen course of action. In this way, the purpose of development is to empower individuals to develop for and by 
themselves. While the recipients of development aid, or indeed the recipients of development policy were once 
thought of as merely objects or targets, with the concept of development as capabilities and empowerment, 
development became agency-oriented; citizens are the agents of their own development. As Sen argued, “with 
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adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other” (Sen, 
1999, p. 11). Such definitions of development meant that no longer was development monopolized by economic 
development. It became human development, with the focus on the capacities and freedoms of individuals, so that 
each human can become the agent of their own lives.
  Needless to say, if we follow this definition of development, then the goals and methods of development will 
be decided by each group, according to their values. Therefore, development strategies must be contextually 
sensitive, and must be made by and for the people concerned. This is, according to Goulet, a condition of ‘authen-
tic development’, which “consists of transforming the [victims of underdevelopment] into subjects, conscious and 
active shapers of their history” (Goulet, 2006, p. xvii). In this way, the only authentic development is self-devel-
opment, and this means that while external agents can play a positive role, local agents are in control. While 
development aid can assist in the process of development, the decision makers must be local.
  This brings us to a final point to make regarding the purpose of development. When is development merely 
a facade for what is in reality ‘antidevelopment’? Whilst an increase in consumption is doubtless necessary to 
relieve suffering and overcome poverty, this does not come at any price. If some suffer, or bear an unreasonable 
cost, while others reap a material benefit, then this is antidevelopment. In this way, as first outlined by Lebret, if 
there exist areas of underdevelopment, this is merely “illusory antidevelopment” because a small number of 
privileged ‘haves’ live in relative luxury at the expense of the many ‘have-nots’ who are thereby deprived of their 
basic human needs (quoted in Goulet, 2006). In our 21st century globalised economy, where income gaps are 
rising both within and across nations, it is especially relevant to consider this ethical aspect of development.
  Whilst development is obviously the responsibility of the state concerned, within the concept of international 
development, the consensus on the purpose of development, as well as the ethics of development, are formulated 
within the framework of the international ODA regime. So, how have these previously outlined ethics of devel-
opment been integrated into Official Development Assistance terminology?
Ethics in the Discourse of the International ODA Regime
At its core, the international ODA regime has the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the OECD, and the two primary global development intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Because the distribution of shares (and hence voting power) in both IGOs 
is according to economy size, and because DAC members are the so-called ‘developed’ states, such economically 
powerful states dominate the international ODA regime. If we imagine a highly simplified international ODA 
regime of concentric circles, these states and IGOs occupy the core. We could plausible place UN organizations, 
regional development banks, some international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and a number of 
emerging economies (such as BRIC countries) in an outer-core or semi-periphery. Finally, in the periphery are the 
underdeveloped countries, wherein live most of the world’s poor. As already discussed in the previous section on 
the motivations for aid, each donor has its own motives and priorities. However, this does not mean that the 
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discourse within the international ODA regime is devoid of ethics of development. The international ODA regime 
has, over time, developed a set of guiding principles that are based on ethics of development.
  The international ODA regime has formulated three primary documents that outline the principles and 
purposes of ODA in the 21st century. These documents were crafted following the High Level Forums (HLF) on 
Aid Effectiveness that was first held in Rome in 2003. The Second HLF was held in Paris in 2005 and produced 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Third HLF was held in Accra in 2008 and resulted in the Accra 
Agenda for Action. Finally, the Fourth HLF, held in Busan in 2011, formulated the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Co-operation, that has been signed by over 100 countries as the “blueprint for maximising 
the impact of aid” (OECD, 1). Each HLF has built upon the work of the previous, and so in this way, the Busan 
Partnership can be seen as the culmination of almost ten years work, and is the closest thing we have to a charter, 
outlining the principles and rules for ODA’s role in international development. There is another reason why the 
Busan Partnership is especially important for this study. President Thein Sein came to power in 2011, and sent the 
current Minister of National Planning and Economic Development, Dr. Kan Zaw, to attend the Busan Conference, 
presumably to assess the methodologies of utilizing ODA in the reform effort.
  The Fourth HLF held in Busan in 2011 was a “turning point” according to the OECD (OECD, 1). The Busan 
Partnership was signed by delegates from donors and recipients alike, and can thus be viewed as further consoli-
dation of the international ODA regime. The formal set of principles, goals and methodologies establishes a 
framework that has been created by consensus. Importantly, this consensus was made by donors and recipients, 
and so includes the actors in the previously mentioned core, as well as those in the periphery of the international 
ODA regime. In this way, it could be argued that the international ODA regime is becoming both more plural and 
more inclusive. The Busan Partnership identifies four principles: ownership, results, partnership and, transpar-
ency and accountability (OECD, 2011, p. 3). The principle of ownership includes the concepts of harmonization, 
alignment and using country systems, all of which were identified as key areas in previous HLFs. Donors must 
align behind the strategies as set out by the recipient, and use local systems to improve capacity/capability, hence 
increasing recipient freedom and independence. Donors must harmonize with other donors to reduce waste and 
reduce the burden on recipient country officials. So as to harmonize with other donors, decision-making on 
development projects would need to be delegated to country-based staff of aid agencies. The principle of owner-
ship is built upon the ethics of independence and self-development, which are key conditions of Goulet’s 
‘authentic development’. Mutual accountability has a contractual quality that is likely based on an ethic of 
development whereby aid is a right of recipients. This is in keeping with the concept of partnership, which is an 
equal relationship of mutual rights and responsibilities. In this way, it is possible to conclude that the development 
ethic of aid as a right has been elevated in prominence.
  Alongside these four primary principles, “the Declaration identifies that promoting human rights, democracy 
and good governance are an integral part of our development efforts” (OECD, 2011, p. 1). The Busan Partnership 
also recognizes the growth in new actors relevant to development cooperation. In addition to the traditional 
OECD ODA donors and IFIs, there are now a multitude of other actors, including emerging economies and 
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private organizations (OECD, 2011, p. 4). In line with this, South-south cooperation is recognized as having the 
potential to significantly assist in the development process. The Busan Partnership also includes a section entitled, 
“from effective aid to cooperation for effective development” (OECD, 2011, p. 9), which includes a call for 
developing countries to increasingly integrate into the global economy, meaning presumably removing trade 
barriers and other state support for targeted domestic industries. In this way, it seems safe to conclude that the 
Busan Partnership accepts the premise that economic liberalism is the model of international development. 
Needless to say, as previously outlined, there is a lively debate on whether this model of economic development 
is in fact anti-development. Therefore, there still remains the question of whether this can be considered as 
authentic development.
  The next section will deal with the extent to which the government of Myanmar has adopted these principles 
as outlined by the international ODA regime. It will also deal with some specific case studies of development 
cooperation to highlight some key issues, or areas of conflict and contradiction.
Myanmar’s development environment
According to the government of Myanmar, “The Nay Pyi Taw Accord for Effective Development Cooperation is 
a set of localised commitments that take as its foundation Myanmar’s unique history, values, governance systems, 
and socio-economic circumstances to create a country-specific set of clear, measurable and monitorable actions.” 
(NPTA, 2013, p. 1). Furthermore, according to the government of Myanmar, “In particular, the Accord has been 
informed by deliberations at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and takes forward the principles 
of ownership, focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, and transparency and accountability, embod-
ied in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation” (NPTA, 2013, p. 1). It seems indeed, that 
the Nay Pyi Taw Accord (NPTA) is a carbon copy of the Busan Partnership, or to rephrase, the NPTA is a ‘local’ 
version of the ‘global’. It may well be that the NPTA, as a set of joint commitments by both donors and recipient, 
is the first such national agreement that has totally adopted the principles of the Busan Partnership. In this way, as 
previously discussed, donor operations in Myanmar may be the first case study of the implementation of this 
newest international ODA regime document.
  In the second paragraph of the preamble to the NPTA, the government of Myanmar commits itself to “people 
centered development” and “participatory processes” (NPTA, 2013, pp. 1-2), meaning human development and/ 
or participatory development. Participatory development is fully embedded in the international ODA discourse 
and based on the ethical considerations of self-government/ independence and freedom/ free choice. Furthermore, 
in the NPTA, the government will utilize international assistance to “enlarge capacity”, and “integrate capacity 
enhancing objectives into all development plans” (NPTA, 2013, p. 2). As with the international ODA regime, 
capacity and capacity development have been elevated to that of a normative position within the domestic 
discourse on development in Myanmar. This is in line with the ethic of self-development, and Sen’s capabilities 
approach to development. The NPTA also commits the government to giving a greater voice for marginalized 
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peoples and to inclusive growth. Finally, the government of Myanmar recognizes that ODA should entail “mutual 
benefits” for development partners and Myanmar (NPTA, 2013, p. 1). Such a condition would surely be necessary 
if the relationship is indeed a partnership, but it is important that this has been formalized in this document. This 
gives weight to the concept of partnership, and also means that the government of Myanmar generally regards 
ODA as a right.
  On the opposite side the NPTA requires development partners to use the “unique local context in Myanmar 
as the starting point” (NPTA, 2013, p. 3). In this way, as is mentioned many times in the document, donors must 
align with national priorities, follow “country-led” development, use “national capacity”, meaning country 
systems, and be transparent (NPTA, 2013, p. 3). All of these stress country ownership of development, and are 
based on the ethic of independence, or in international relations, on the principle of sovereignty.
  It is likely that sovereignty is an especially important issue in Myanmar. One reason for this is that the 
Myanmar state is still in the process of state building. In the immediate post-independence period of state build-
ing, “the Constitutional government systems could not overcome the structural separation of center from periph-
ery” (Prasse-Freeman, 2012, p. 135). Since independence, the Myanmar state has never been able to extend its 
authority over all of its territory, and so this inability to overcome the structural separation still remains. We 
should also point out that Myanmar’s strong propensity for staunch independence stems, to some extent at least, 
from its colonial experience.
  The second, and interconnected reason for the importance of the issue of sovereignty is the fragility of 
inter-ethnic relations. Ethnic-based conflict has been an ever-present scourge limiting state-building efforts and 
development. Since independence, the extended conflict between the Burman majority of the center, and the 
ethnic minorities of the periphery, resulted in an institutionalized ethnocentrism, which became a core component 
of state sovereignty. Walton (2013) has argued that Burman-ness “functions as a privileged identity”, and more 
importantly perhaps, that the Burmans are largely blind to this. Needless to say, this needs to be recognized before 
it can be overcome, and to overcome is an essential step if a durable political solution to ethnic conflict is to be 
found. Ethnocentrism supports independence for the Burman majority, but is in direct contrast to independence 
for the ethnic minorities. In the same way, ethnocentrism supports development for the Burman majority, but 
hinders development for the ethnic minorities. This severely complicates the issue of ownership, and the ethics of 
independence, self-development and freedom, undermining so called ‘authentic development’. As will be shown 
in our first case study, dealing with this is a major challenge for donors.
National Census
The controversy surrounding the 2014 census provides an insight into both the complexity of ethnicity-related 
issues, and also the delicate role that donors need to play. Myanmar has not carried out a census since 1983, and 
so the lack of data is a serious problem for the government and for donors. Dependable data is necessary for 
development plans, but also for the 2015 national elections. The census was conducted in March/ April 2014, with 
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preliminary results released in the summer of 2014, and the full results in 2015. The United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) provided technical support, which included training the 100,000-plus teachers who would be 
census takers, and assisting in drafting the census questionnaire forms. The UK’s Department for International 
Development (DfID) was the primary foreign donor, provided US$16 million in financial support, and the 
Myanmar government paid US$15 million. Even though the considerable risks and potential for conflict were 
identified prior to the census being carried out, the donors and the government decided that the benefits 
outweighed the costs (IGC, 2014). The primary cause for concern was the inclusion of questions on ethnicity. 
There was virtually no consultative process before the drafting of the census questionnaire, and instead the 
government merely used the same ethnic classifications that had been used in the 1983 census (Irrawaddy, 
2014-3). A number of ethnic groups issued statements that were critical of the census, and some asked that the 
census be postponed so that consultations could take place (Irrawaddy, 2014-2/3). An example of the inappropri-
ateness of the ethnic classifications is the 53 Chin subgroups on the census list of ethnic groups. Many of these, 
the Chin themselves do not recognize or use (Economist, 2014). It seems that within the minefield of ethnic 
politics in Myanmar, the government approach to the issue of ethnicity was interpreted as evidence of the contin-
ued ethnocentrism of the state.
  The issue of the Rohingya was also inflamed by the census. The Rohingya are Muslims resident in Rakhine 
State, although according to the Myanmar government they are Bengali, and hence not Myanmar citizens. This 
makes them in effect, stateless. The census form included a section for people to self-identify their ethnicity. 
However, Buddhist nationalists in Rakhine state feared that Rohingya would identify themselves as Rohingya, 
and this would be a path towards final acceptance and citizenship. In response to this fear, at the last minute the 
government said that they would ignore anyone who tried to self-identify their ethnicity as Rohingya (MRG, 
2014). According to the UNFPA, this went against an agreement the government had made with them to allow all 
ethnic groups to self-identify their ethnicity (Guardian, 2014). Violence erupted in Rakhine state at the time of the 
census. Violence also erupted in Kachin and Shan state as a result of the census (ICG, 2014). International donors, 
the UNFPA and DfID in particular, have been heavily criticized for their role in the census (Karen News, 2014). 
Amnesty International called the exclusion of Rohingya who refused to identify themselves as ‘Bengali’, “a clear 
violation of the right to self-identification” (Amnesty, 2014). As identified by Amnesty International, the census 
was not conducted in accordance with the ethic of self-development, and this is not just in reference to the 
Rohingya, but also other ethnic groups. We could also argue that participatory development, and its ethical 
underpinnings of free will and independence were ignored. The 2014 census has certainly highlighted the contin-
ued ethnocentric tendencies of the Myanmar state, and this is regardless of the democratic reforms.
  However, in line with the principles as laid out by the international ODA regime, donors were merely 
assisting the government’s development plan. In this way, donor practices were aligned with recipient requests. 
The use of teachers as census takers was also in keeping with the use of recipient country systems, as stipulated 
by the Busan Partnership. In both these two ways, ownership was respected. However, that was country owner-
ship and not local ownership. Paradoxically, while the NPTA requires development partners to use the “unique 
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local context in Myanmar as the starting point”, the government of Myanmar interprets this in a different manner 
than do the ethnic groups. In practical terms, as identified by DfID, reliable data is so crucial for Myanmar’s 
development, and the current lack of reliable data is such a serious bottleneck to development, the census had to 
be carried out as soon as possible. We could interpret this situation as being one in which the state interprets 
self-development and ownership to mean state ownership, as opposed to foreign ownership; the state has the 
authority to decide. Certainly, such a tendency exists in almost any state, and is commonplace in many. As 
previously outlined, the state of Myanmar has had a long-held prevalence for such a perspective.
Community Driven Development
Top-down decision-making has been an intrinsic feature of Myanmar’s political economy for some time. While 
traditional authority is usually based on such processes, years of military and pseudo-military rule in Myanmar 
has enforced a rigid hierarchical decision-making process. This top-down decision-making obviously has import-
ant implications for the ethics of independence and free will, and the connected principles of self-development 
and agency-oriented development. Hierarchical decision-making is also likely to have a tendency towards 
exclusivity because of its limited plurality. This would then have adverse consequences for inclusive develop-
ment, which is also stipulated to be a principle of ODA (in the Busan Partnership) and development (in the 
NPTA).
  The World Bank is now in full engagement with the government of Myanmar, and the Bank is now assisting 
in building confidence in President Thein Sein’s reform process. Beginning in 2013, the Bank is funding a US$80 
million National Community Driven Development Project to support, “an urgent government priority critical to 
the success of Myanmar’s triple transition - moving from top-down decision making to participatory approaches 
and bottom up planning” (IDA and IFC, 2012, p. 1). With the focus on reducing poverty, World Bank finance 
would be provided to local communities who would choose and manage the small infrastructure projects they 
required. Even prior to implementation, this project received criticism from civil society organizations (CSOs) in 
Myanmar. A lack of transparency, and a lack of consultation were the prime criticisms (Irrawaddy, 2012). 
According to these CSOs, the Bank’s strong desire to support the government’s reform process had resulted in it 
ignoring its own procedures. However, it should be pointed out that, this resulted from Myanmar government 
pressure to have concrete results to show the populace before the 2015 national elections. Indeed, this sense of 
urgency had been a problem for the World Bank because it could not move as fast as the government was request-
ing it to do2). To counter the criticisms of the CSOs, it seems that the World Bank carried out an exhaustive 
consultation process in the December 2012-January 2013 period (World Bank, 2012). Furthermore, the selection 
of pilot townships was done through a consultation process that included three sets of workshops in February 
2013 to which various stakeholders were invited. These stakeholders included CSOs, local NGOs, donor and 
government officials. After these consultations, the government chose the initial pilot townships, all in remote 
regions. Combined, these townships have 390 villages with a population of 225,941 (World Bank, 2014-2). 
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According to the World Bank, “about 57 percent of the households in the project villages participated in the 
planning, decision making and the subproject implementation processes” (World Bank, 2014-2). The Bank 
provided training to empower them to choose and then implement project management. In September 2014, 
representatives of the pilot townships, as well as government and donor officials attended a review session in Nay 
Pyi Taw (World Bank, 2014-1). An event such as this is an essential part of this project. For reformers within the 
government, it is necessary to publicize, whenever possible, the concrete benefits that citizens have received. 
Furthermore, it needs to be explicit that such benefits result from international reengagement, which is a funda-
mental element of the reforms. In this way, it is no surprise that the feedback from locals was overwhelmingly 
positive, although ‘activist’ news organizations such as the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB, 2014) have called 
the project a failure, arguing that Bank officials, “clearly have no knowledge of how these projects are being 
implemented on the ground”. In contrast to this, the World Bank claim that in the first year, the project “has 
successfully implemented 357 sub-projects which improve access to basic infrastructure and services in a partic-
ipatory manner in three remote rural townships in Myanmar” (World Bank, 2014-2). Having said that, anecdotal 
evidence that supports the perspective of the DVB certainly exists. In interviews with Burmese development 
specialist in Yangon, this author has heard comments such as, “the World Bank gave grants to schools, but the 
head teachers didn’t know how to use it”3). Such leakages are an expected part of all development projects, and 
this is especially the case when the overall risk is ‘high’, as the Bank has identified it to be with this project (World 
Bank, 2014-2).
  As of January 2015, only US$16 million had been disbursed, although the project will run until January 
2019. In this way, it is too early to really assess the development impact, although it is still possible to probe its 
ethical dimensions. If these community driven development projects do indeed allow communities to decide their 
own development, then they could also enable authentic development, which would be in line with the ethics of 
free will and independence that underpin self-development. In this way, it seems that the state, contrary to tradi-
tion, allowed locals to become decision makers, to become agents of their own development. The World Bank 
also provided capacity development to empower locals. In terms of the discourse of the international ODA 
regime, this project was in accordance with the principles of alignment and ownership because it was at the 
request of the government, and the decision makers were national (choosing the townships) and local (choosing 
the individual projects). Furthermore, the World Bank utilized country systems by providing training directly to 
local citizens in the project townships. On balance, it seems that this project has the potential to both, implement 
according to the principles of the international ODA regime, and also adhere to ethics of development.
Thilawa SEZ
‘Land Grabbing’, or the seizing of land by the state (or other organizations) in an illegal or unfair manner is a 
serious problem in Myanmar. More than 6,000 complaints have been filed with the Parliamentary Land 
Investigation Committee, and the government has taken action in only a fraction of these (Irrawaddy, 2014-1). Of 
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particular interest to this paper is the prevalence of land rights (and related) issues on sites that will become 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which are being constructed in Myanmar. Thilawa SEZ, near Yangon, is being 
constructed in partnership with Japanese public and private investors, and will employ 70,000 workers when it is 
fully operational (Economist, 2014).
  According to the 2014 Special Economic Zone Law, homes and farming properties located on a proposed 
SEZ must be relocated and reimbursed (SEZ Law, 2014). This law provides the legal framework for confiscating 
land. So what has happened in Thilawa? In 2013 an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was carried out by 
the Japanese consultancy Nippon Koei, who employed the Burmese consultancy Resource & Environment 
Myanmar Ltd. to carry out the Field Survey. The evaluation of this EIA report with regards to social impacts such 
as involuntary resettlement and misdistribution of benefit and damage was that “impacts are not clear, need more 
investigation” (Nihon Koei, 2013, p. 100). However, importantly the report also states that, “The impact evalua-
tion items such as involuntary resettlement, gender, children’s right which may affect the people who live or earn 
their living in the Class A area, is not included. These items will be dealt with [by] the government of Myanmar 
and relevant authorities.” (Nihon Koei, 2013, p. 101). This means that Nihon Koei did not investigate the poten-
tial land issues, and merely left the Myanmar government to deal with them. This is obviously in direct contradic-
tion to the principle of mutual accountability as outlined by the Busan Partnership. Despite the substantial changes 
that have resulted from the reforms, it should have been understood that, given Myanmar’s recent history, the 
potential for violations of human rights were real and considerable. The prevalence of human rights abuses by the 
state kept Myanmar in the global media spotlight for over two decades. Foreign partners of the Thilawa project 
should have been especially vigilant regarding such tendencies. In accordance with participatory development 
(and the ethics of independence and free will), two Stakeholder Meetings were held in 2013. However, “based on 
the discussion among Myanmar and Japan Consortium for Thilawa Special Economic Zone Development Project 
(Class A), concerned and relevant participants for the stakeholder meetings were identified”. No local citizens 
attended the first meeting, and only one attended the second meeting, although representatives of the media 
attended both meetings. Obviously this contravenes the development ethics of independence and free will, which 
are translated into participatory development by the international ODA regime. State ownership has also taken 
priority over local ownership, and in this way it would be difficult to call the Thilawa project authentic develop-
ment (as previously defined). However, we should also state that the project was first identified by the Myanmar 
government, and so donor support was aligned with recipient development plans. Furthermore, the Thilawa 
project is not agency-oriented development. Indeed, external agents, rather than merely assisting locals, seem to 
be almost the only stakeholders.
  According to a report by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), “During phase one of the project, affected 
households were not consulted, received inadequate compensation, and were given limited time to prepare for 
relocation”, thus, “violating their right to adequate housing and health care” (RFA, 2013). PHR surveyed 29 of the 
68 households that were displaced by the first part of the Thilawa project. A number of those forced to relocate 
filed formal complaints with JICA, presuming perhaps that JICA had a more sympathetic ear. In response, JICA 
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conducted an investigation into the conditions of resettled locals. The resulting JICA report too, was criticized by 
the Thilawa Social Development Group (a residents group) for, amongst other things, insinuating that some 
people had been irresponsible with their compensation and this was a reason for their impoverishment (Irrawaddy, 
2014-4).
  The Thilawa project is a flagship project both of the reinvigorated Japan-Myanmar relationship, and of the 
government’s reform effort. The administration of President Thein Sein wanted concrete results that could be used 
in the 2015 national elections to galvanize support for the reform effort of his party, the Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP). One of these concrete results was to be the Thilawa SEZ. In 2012, according to a 
Japanese Embassy official Mr. Maruyama, the Myanmar government “are requesting that the project be finished 
before 2015”. He called this request “mission impossible” (Fuller, 2012). However, the first stage of Thilawa SEZ 
was indeed operational by the summer of 2015. It seems likely that the maladroit manner in which the relocation 
issue was dealt with in phase one of the project was at least partly due to these time pressures. It also seems that 
the process for dealing with forced relocations in the second stage of the Thilawa project is being dealt with in a 
much better manner than in the first stage. An example of this is that about 100 local residents attended the 
Stakeholders Meeting in June 2014. Furthermore, according to the 2014 Special Economic Zone Law, it is the 
responsibility of the developer or investors to “pay the agreed expenditures for transfer, resettlement and compen-
sation” (Myanmar SEZ Law, Chapter 7, No. 80).
  Importantly perhaps, the Thilawa SEZ is a public-private transnational partnership, with the Myanmar 
government and JICA holding minor stakes. Even though JICA is providing ODA loans for the construction of 
infrastructure, its stake, along with that of the Myanmar government stakes are an explicit public endorsement of 
the project, providing a solid guarantee for private investors. This is the type of partnership that exists in the 
Thilawa SEZ. It is a business partnership, which can access public finance in the form of Japanese ODA.
Conclusions
The sense of urgency surrounding all three projects led to donors ignoring some of their own guidelines. The 
requests from the Myanmar government for speedy completion and quick gains, caused donors to fast track the 
projects. Even though this inevitably compromised some of the principles of the international ODA regime 
(inclusivity, participatory development, mutual accountability), and their ethical foundations (independence, free 
will), the donors and the government of Myanmar decided that the potential benefit outweighed the cost. In the 
case of the census, the toxic issue of ethnicity was inflamed by Burmese ethnocentric tendencies. This under-
mined the mutual accountability principle of ODA, and ignored the right to self-development (of ethnic minori-
ties), and the ethics of independence and free will.
  In the case of the Thilawa SEZ too, the sensitive land rights issue was ignored, despite the propensity for 
such activity in Myanmar. The ethics of independence and freedom that underpin the right to self-development 
were subordinated to other priorities. Furthermore, ownership was characterized by state, or national ownership, 
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which took precedence over local ownership. The resulting partnership was between foreign donors and the state, 
and significant affected groups were excluded. Having said that, both projects were aligned with the recipient’s 
development plans, and both also utilized country systems. In this way, to the extent possible, they supported 
capacity development in the recipient country. Therefore, we could say that, according to the ODA principles of 
harmonizing and utilizing country systems, the ownership and capacity elements of partnership were adhered to 
in these two projects. In this way then, the ethics of freedom and independence that manifest in the concept of 
capacity were satisfied. However, mutual accountability seems to have suffered. In both cases, the government 
failed to adhere to the standards it had set in the NPT accords. This undermined the partnership between donor 
and recipient. In the case of the National Community Driven Development project, the imperative of quick results 
may have caused considerable wastage. However, this project has the most potential for fostering self-develop-
ment and agency-oriented development. In this way, it is perhaps the most ethical of the projects analyzed here.
  Myanmar is still in the nascent stage of its transition. President Thein Sein’s reform process began only in 
2011, and it will probably take a generation to complete Myanmar’s transition to an open society, market economy 
and plural democracy. Therefore, this study is limited in its ability to fully analyze and explain a process that still 
has a long way to go. The donor projects here are the first tentative steps in supporting the transition in Myanmar. 
They are however crucial steps. They will be determining the path ahead to a certain degree, and will be providing 
valuable lessons for the future.
  On balance, we can conclude that the principles of ODA as defined by the international ODA regime are 
largely based on the ethics of freedom and independence. By adopted the Busan Partnership, the Myanmar 
government has accepted these ethics as also underpinning their own development strategies. We have shown that 
the twin issues of urgency and ethnocentrism have, to some degree, compromised these ethics of development and 
the related principles of ODA. However, in other ways, we have found that ethics of development are being 
adhered to in ODA donor operations in Myanmar. Donors are respecting recipient ownership, although this often 
means state ownership, rather than local ownership. Donors are also utilizing country systems, which should 
enhance capacity, and enable self-development. We have found examples of projects that follow an agency- 
oriented approach to development.
  However, we should also say that it is still early days. If Myanmar is truly to transition to an open society, it 
will likely take a generation. The people of Myanmar, like all others, deserve the chance to self- development, 
based on the ethics of freedom and independence. It is perhaps inevitable that there will be winners and losers in 
this effort, and in this way, Myanmar’s development will be yet another example of anti-development. However, 
this perspective is perhaps too dogmatic. Regardless, Myanmar’s reengagement with the donor community will 
continue to provide an important case study with which to investigate the realities of ODA practices in the early 
21st century.
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Notes
 1)  It is estimated that the Burman ethnic group makes up 60-70% the population of Myanmar (Smith, 1999).
 2)  Interview with World Bank official, Yangon, August 2013.
 3)  Interview with Burmese Development Specialist, Yangon, August 2014.
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